# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 13 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 517th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Nigeria, Iraq and Finland. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): We have just entered into the second third of the summer part of the Conference. Four weeks still remain for effective negotiation. Time is pressing if we are to reach tangible results in the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Together we have made a fresh start following the Paris Conference. In the Paris Declaration all States came out in favour of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. All States advocated that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be global and comprehensive as well as effectively verifiable. All States pronounced themselves in favour of concluding the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest possible date. This is from our point of view the substance of the agreements reached in Paris, and this is our view of their interrelationship - you cannot do one thing without the other.

Have not the events of the recent past visibly shown that the use of chemical weapons prohibited under the Geneva Protocol can only be precluded in future if they are completely banned with global effect at the earliest possible date? To stop the production of chemical weapons, to advance towards their destruction, to prevent their proliferation - these are, no doubt, significant moves for their comprehensive prohibition. Do not measures against the proliferation of chemical weapons however, lose something of their positive impact if they are deprived of their character as an interim measure? Is it not urgently necessary to finalize work on the verification system without allowing any further delays in the negotiations? Otherwise, we think, a situation could arise where the existence of ever more sophisticated chemical weapons in ever more hands would render effective verification of their prohibition extremely complicated or would even make it impossible.

The verification system for a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has a key role in the present negotiations. Permit me, therefore, to offer a few comments on this problem. Article VI of the draft convention together with the annexes thereto already contains a sound system of provisions for effective verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This system is being supplemented at present in Working Group 4. The final touches are being put to the régime attached to list 1. The lists of chemicals are being amended and defined.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

As regards verification of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons production outside the framework set by article VI, this should, in our view, be ensured, in the first place, by means of challenge inspections. A provision to this effect, however, has not been agreed upon so far. The basic ideas set forth in the "Ekeus Paper" (document CD/881, pages 141 and 142) have not been developed further since 1987. Therefore, the next logical step would be to seek understanding in principle on challenge inspection and to include relevant provisions in article IX of the draft convention. All efforts undertaken by the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, to this effect deserve our unqualified support.

It is, in fact, high time in our view for delegations to disclose their positions on such questions as: the right to request an on-site inspection at any time and anywhere; the mandatory character of such an inspection without a right of refusal; the procedure to be applied in case agreement on arrangements alternative to full and comprehensive access cannot be achieved; and the procedure after submission of the inspection report. In this way, it would be possible to bridge existing differences of opinion which have surfaced on this matter and to draft a mutually agreed text of article IX, part 2.

The question whether additional verification provisions are necessary beyond the framework established by article VI and the means of challenge inspection has been discussed to date without conclusive results being attained. If the general opinion tends to deem it necessary that the verification system be supplemented, we, for our part, will join in efforts to search for a generally acceptable and effective solution. It is our understanding that such measures shall correspond to defined additional verification needs and shall require no disproportionate additional costs.

I am underlining this since we should avoid formulating additional measures in the form of a costly and detailed mechanism similar to the one applied with articles IV, V and VI. On the basis of the provisions set out in article VI, it would suffice to outline the general framework for supplementary measures. It should be incumbent upon the organs of the future organization to render the procedure most effective by making use of the experience gathered in the implementation of the Convention. Here we need to clarify which supplementary measures would be eligible, routine inspections or inspections initiated by member States. Two possible approaches have been outlined in the working paper of the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/869) and in the working paper of the United Kingdom (CD/909).

At the present stage of negotiations, we believe the discussion ought to be focused on practical problems. What we have in mind in this context is to consider the possibility of concentrating additional routine verification measures, for example, ad hoc checks, on a relatively small number of facilities which on account of their technological parameters pose a risk to the convention. In this way, the available financial resources of the future Organization could be efficiently used for particularly sensitive facilities. To select such facilities would be the task in our view of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

It would be advisable to apply an objective selection mechanism. The application of advanced methods which are common practice in the chemical industry, for example, work with computer-aided synthesis banks and screening schemes, could serve as a suitable means to identify facilities which have a significant potential to be misused for CW production. Applying such a method, it would be possible to cover an important area where violations of the convention may occur, for example, facilities for organophosphorus chemistry.

Other facilities not accessible by this approach could, however, also be misused for the production of certain chemical agents. Verification on the basis of objective selection methods would not be an appropriate means of deterrence in this respect. The question is legitimate, we think, whether it would be possible to effectively make use of challenge inspection against potential violations of the convention which might occur in such facilities. If there is, however, a need for additional verification provisions, then it could, in our opinion, only be something rather different from challenge inspection. This could be done by means of a verification procedure for which the Organization would be responsible but which would be initiated by a member State.

From all this it can be gathered that the development of the verification system will be a permanent task in the implementation process of the convention. With the present system of verification provisions, which encompasses data reporting and monitoring, routine on-site inspection and challenge inspection, a reliable basis has been created to this end. It must be expandable and flexible. The provisions on the organs of the future Organization should ensure that the viability of this system is guaranteed on an institutional basis.

Those were a few comments on our part concerning the settlement of still pending essential issues in the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. We have made these observations in the conviction that given the requisite will and readiness of all parties, it will indeed be possible in the remainder of the session to reach an understanding on these issues and on other essential subjects under negotiation. The committed, creative and methodical guidance of the negotiations by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and his bureau encourages us in this endeavour. If we work energetically to bridge the remaining differences in a flexible manner and display the necessary sense of determination, it will be possible that the outcome yielded so far in the negotiations will be fixed in the "rolling text" and that the summer session will produce positive results. A good many things quite certainly remain to be done in order to bring about a solution on those issues where there is a possibility of promising results during the summer session. We should centre our efforts on these questions in the course of the intersessional period of work if agreed upon. Along these lines, our delegation will play an active part in compliance with the recent declaration of the Warsaw Treaty States.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for my delegation to join those who have already congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Your wealth of experience and diplomatic skill will no doubt assist the Conference to advance its work. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, deserves our appreciation for the very able manner in which he successfully steered the work of the Conference in the month of June. Let me seize this opportunity to welcome the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, to the CD.

Before addressing myself to some of the specific items on our agenda, permit me to comment briefly on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is increasingly getting worried at the slow pace of negotiations in the various Ad Hoc Committees. Regrettably the Conference has so far not achieved tangible progress on any of the first three items on nuclear disarmament. Yet this inaction has not been due to any lack of texts or proposals. Nor was it due to a lack of serious sense of concern and urgency about the expensive and wasteful arms race. The world cannot however wait for a passive CD, although it would be wrong to blame the lack of progress on the relative passivity alone.

The increasing shift of responsibility, of emphasis and attention, from the CD to other forums where more credible disarmament negotiations are taking place has continuously denied the Conference the much-needed political will which forms the basis of our work. Of course, it may not be realistic to expect that every effort in the field of disarmament, nuclear or conventional weapons, should await the pleasure of the Conference. To do so would be to exaggerate the importance and role of the CD. This notwithstanding, its actions or inactions are having telling effects on its credibility, thereby leading to serious diffusion of responsibility for disarmament negotiations. My delegation believes there is a point in all this. As the single world forum for multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament must profess and defend its relevance by being aware of its responsibilities and obligations. It must set its house in order by being responsive to the aspirations of mankind. The impression must not be created that the Governments represented in the CD are less committed to it than they are to the other forums. In short, the CD must confront its 1989 approved programme of work and adopt a more realistic, flexible and rewarding method of accomplishing it.

The current international situation should be seen not as a deterrent to disarmament negotiations, but rather as a catalyst to those negotiations. The yearning of the international community to remove the danger of nuclear war should find expression in the realization by the Conference of the urgent need for all nuclear-weapon States to cease the testing of nuclear weapons. There is a need for all delegations to confront in a more constructive manner the two central and priority issues before this Conference, namely - the nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The intensity of the consideration of these items on our agenda underscores their importance not only as indicated in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, but also as the direct response to the legitimate concerns of the international community over the increasing arms race. We cannot deny the importance and the urgency attached to these questions, and to the need to initiate substantive multilateral negotiations as indicated in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Despite the concern of the international community about the irrationality of the race for the development of sophisticated nuclear weapons, the arms race continues unabated. Admittedly, by signing the INF Treaty, both the Soviet Union and the United States have demonstrated their recognition of the advantages of seeking security through disarmament and co-operation. The INF no doubt constitutes a milestone in international disarmament efforts. This however represents one step in a journey of a thousand kilometres to establish a just and lasting peace in the world.

Certain basic factors have already been accepted by all as prerequisites for effective nuclear disarmament negotiations. Among these factors are: the undiminished security of all States at progressively lower levels of armaments; account to be taken of the relative quantitative and qualitative level of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; an adequate measure of verification to be part of each agreement; and the special responsibility devolving on the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals. We should, however, bear in mind that the ultimate goal of negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons such that the undiminished security of all countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear alike, will be disassociated from nuclear weapons. In this respect, my delegation believes that the question of a comprehensive test ban falls more appropriately within the competence of this Conference. We believe that the time is now ripe for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the item, with appropriate mandate to commence practical work. A comprehensive test-ban treaty should be recognized as an indispensable step on the road to positive nuclear disarmament.

It will be recalled that in the absence of a mandate, six members of the CD launched an initiative last August, proposing an amendment conference for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty as a way of putting the issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty back on the international agenda. My delegation has always felt that the CTBT is absolutely essential for the preservation of the régime of non-proliferation embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. CTBT is potentially less restrictive and might open the way for the non-NPT signatories to become members. We do not share the view that such a bold initiative could be regarded as irresponsible.

Nigeria was one of the first States to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We did so because we believed that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of warfare. Indeed, they are too lethal to be used in the game of power politics. As I mentioned in my statement last February, the NPT was conceived as an important instrument to be complemented by other collateral measures for an effective régime on non-proliferation. We knew it was not perfect and that to some extent it was discriminatory and fraught with inequalities of rights and obligations. But we had hoped, perhaps too innocently, that it would arrest the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the existing nuclear arsenal. Was our hope in the Treaty misplaced? Even though we have been denied the economic and scientific benefits of its articles IV and V, where has the lack of progress, the inaction, on the part of the nuclear Powers with respect to the ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty led us? Was it too much to expect that the nuclear Powers had the same fears of a nuclear holocaust as we did?

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Do they not also have some obligations to fulfil under the Treaty? This notwithstanding, let me emphasize that Nigeria believes in the Treaty, and similarly, we still believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a few States increases the insecurity of other States.

No State has the right to play dog-in-the-manger in an arms race, to limit the number of nuclear States, as long as it cannot show that it fulfils its obligations towards mankind. It is an unfortunate irony that to become a major Power today, one must possess nuclear weapons.

The year 1990, which is the year for the Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, places an added responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation believes that the NPT is a vital ingredient in a nuclear non-proliferation régime. However, if a greater global consensus is to be developed, it will be essential to preserve the advance towards that goal represented by the NPT and to ensure further progress through other instruments. Non-proliferation in the 1990s based exclusively on the NPT may receive a severe set-back in the light of the criticisms of the parties and non-parties alike. If the Conference on Disarmament is not to contribute to that set-back, no obstacle should be put in its way in negotiating an instrument of such vital importance for horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As the distinguished head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Theorin, rightly observed in her statement last June, and I quote: "For the credibility of the NPT régime, and in order to reinforce it, it is imperative that also the nuclear weapon States now fulfil all their obligations - they should promptly agree to start negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". We fully share this concern.

Nigeria continues to attach considerable interest to the question of negative security assurances, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on this item with a full negotiating mandate is commendable. From all indications, time had blurred our vision to the extent that what commenced over two decades ago, as a legitimate concern for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has now come to be associated more with the security of nuclear-weapon States almost to the total exclusion of the former. If we may cast our minds back, the question of negative security assurances came into being about 24 years ago, during the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the non-aligned countries in the ENDC specifically sought assurances that renunciation of nuclear weapons would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation.

Nigeria had on many occasions made observations on the unilateral declarations and had expressed the position that they were only helpful to the extent that they expressed the concern of nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations. The declarations by themselves do not and cannot constitute firm, credible and binding agreements since they were not negotiated and are unverifiable, conflicting in character and subject to divergent interpretations. Above all, the declarations sought to assure the security of nuclear-weapon States only.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

We remain convinced that the most effective measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament. Until this is achieved, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation feels that all nuclear-weapon States should show greater commitment and understanding on this issue. Otherwise, the impression could be created that the nuclear-weapon States only seek to perpetuate their present military superiority and deny others the right to undiminished security. My delegation believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a responsibility to assure non-nuclear-weapon States of their commitment by attending to these legitimate concerns. Unless this is clearly demonstrated, those who have acceded to the 1968 NPT cannot be expected to feel vindicated, and those who did not accept the Treaty would justifiably even move further away from its objectives. The notion that there are two categories of States, one endowed with a sense of responsibility to manage nuclear weapons, while the other cannot be trusted, and must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, should be discouraged.

Let me emphasize that the conclusion of an agreement on negative security assurances should not be made conditional upon the implementation of other collateral measures. All other measures should be treated separately on their own merit. Nigeria believes that the States which have demonstrated by renouncing the nuclear option in a legally binding international instrument should also be eligible for negative security assurances, despite the questions being raised about the level that some of them have actually reached in developing their nuclear capability.

Let me briefly comment on the ongoing negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the wise guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France. Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on her territory. As has been rightly stressed several times before in the Conference, the credibility of the convention will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of the verification régime that will finally be elaborated for the convention. The verification régime should therefore give very convincing assurance of compliance with the purposes and objectives of the convention, or that non-compliance will be detected. Such a régime would indeed strengthen the convention.

The many trial inspections undertaken so far are very vital for the elaboration of the verification régime. I wish to place on record our appreciation for the very commendable contribution by the Finnish delegation through its work in developing some basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the convention in the area of instrumentation, standard operating procedures and a computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals. We note with satisfaction the delegation's offer to train analytical chemists in the methods of analysis and instrumentation.

My delegation welcomes the intense discussions held by experts from industry on the question of confidentiality. The need to ensure effective verification by obtaining adequate information from industry was pitted

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

against the demand of industry to severely restrict the information that may be demanded for verification purposes. It is reassuring that although the experts were all too anxious to ensure that industrial secrets were given sufficient consideration and protection, as well as compensation if breached, they were also aware of the need to strengthen the convention.

This brings me to the question of sanctions. This issue received limited attention during the spring session. It is however now receiving serious consideration in Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee. We welcome any measure that can strengthen the convention that is currently being elaborated. The provision of sanctions or penalties for violations of the convention, is one such measure which my delegation attaches great importance to. The nature of the sanctions or penalty should be determined by the extent of the violation. Minor violations should attract automatic and mandatory sanctions while major violations should, after prompt investigation, be dealt with speedily first by the Conference of States parties and thereafter by the Security Council. Once a decision is taken to penalize a violation of the convention, the sanctions should be mandatory, effective and collectively undertaken by all States parties. It is equally important that sanctions should also be applied to non-States parties who violate the convention. By signing the convention a State party will be denying itself the right to produce or acquire this weapon, which a non-State party may produce and even use freely if there is no such deterrent measure. States parties will therefore be at a disadvantage, and also placed at the mercy of the non-States parties which may be tempted to use such weapons against them. Collective action by States parties against such violations of the convention would deter non-States parties from possible breach.

Let me conclude my statement with a brief comment on the forthcoming Canberra Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons. The involvement of experts in the work of the Conference on Disarmament has proved to be very useful in our negotiations. It is hoped that the Canberra meeting will enable the chemical industry to appreciate the need for a chemical weapons convention. However, my delegation is constrained to urge that the Canberra meeting should not be used to promote non-proliferation of chemical weapons, export control of chemicals to developing countries and restriction on transfer of technology to developing countries. To do otherwise would undermine the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed put in jeopardy the work that has so far been done on the convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind words to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Ambassador Barzan Al-Tikriti.

Mr. BARZAN AL-TIKRITI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): First of all, I should like to express my appreciation to the President and to the secretariat of the Disarmament Conference for their untiring efforts to organize our work and enable the Conference to attain its objectives. The people of Iraq share the aspirations of other peoples for a world where peace and security prevail. This is essential for freedom and the furtherance of progress in the spiritual and material spheres of life. Iraq is part of the Arab nation, which believes in peace, equitable relations among peoples and respect for international law and is seeking to ensure that the values of charity, peace

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

and justice prevail throughout the world. Without such relations among States, durable peace cannot be established, and the disarmament process cannot therefore follow its due course, since an uneasy peace that is liable to be breached forces States to remain constantly on their guard to protect their sovereignty and security and exercise their right to self-defence. International relations have recently been characterized by a relaxation of tension, and this has allowed the international community to find solutions to several regional and international problems and conflicts. However, this relaxation of tension has not so far had the desired effect on the work of the Disarmament Conference, this body which is the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the disarmamemt sphere. As you are all aware, disarmament requires real international co-operation based on good faith with a view to the formulation of universal principles on the basic issues facing the international community, such as the prevention of nuclear war, the banning of tests, the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the achievement of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. The strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of particular importance in some regions of the world, especially the Middle East, where there is no doubt that nuclear weapons have appeared, since they have been acquired by Israel. Israel also has chemical weapons and long-range missiles. This necessitates the adoption of appropriate and effective international measures, to denuclearize the Middle East, strengthen peace and security and promote an arms balance there.

The delegation of the Republic of Iraq supports Peru's draft resolution designed to prevent any attack on nuclear facilities because the effects of such an attack would not be confined to the target country but would have far-reaching consequences. The whole of mankind would be affected. In this connection, we remind the Conference of the Israeli aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was intended for peaceful purposes, and placed under international supervision. This year we have an opportunity to reaffirm in the Conference Iraq's firm commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and its unswerving support for international endeavours in the field of disarmament. Iraq was one of the first States to accede to the international conventions and treaties in this field.

I should have liked to end my statement here, but for the ill-considered declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran last week, the form and substance of which constituted an unjustified attack on my country. As you are aware, the Conference on Disarmament is the only international body established to conduct negotiations on disarmament and formulate effective measures to control the arms race and to rescue humanity from the spectre of total disaster brought about by the stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This Conference is not responsible for finding solutions to regional conflicts; that is the task of other bodies. However, the Iranian régime's representatives are in the habit of taking advantage of this Conference for purposes of propaganda, thereby involving it in matters that are not within its purview and detracting from its credibility as a body in which the whole of humanity has placed its hopes for significant achievements in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

The representatives of the Iranian régime are well aware that this Conference has no mandate to implement Security Council resolution 598, nor does it have competence to intervene in, or seek solutions to, regional conflicts. However, by raising the subject of the war here, they are attempting to evade their responsibilities in regard to the implementation of resolution 598 and justify their reluctance to comply with the agreement of 8 August 1988, under which the two parties have an obligation to hold direct negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations immediately after the entry into force of the cease-fire, with a view to reaching a common understanding on all the other provisions of resolution 598, including the measures and timetables needed to that end.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran feigned dismay at the lack of progress in the implementation of resolution 598, although it is he who has so far refused to enter into direct negotiations, insisting on a selective approach to the implementation of the resolution, which of course commits his Government to absolutely nothing. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is really eager for peace, it might justifiably be wondered why he refuses to enter into direct negotiations, when his Government has undertaken to do so in a document signed by the Secretary-General? If he really believes in the binding nature of resolution 598, has he perhaps forgotten that his country agreed to that resolution only after the collapse of its military front, a whole year after its adoption by the Security Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran drew your attention to the question of withdrawal and misconstrued the letter and spirit of the resolution, treating it as a first step towards a comprehensive settlement, although the detailed provisions of the cease-fire have not yet been agreed, nor have they been embodied in any signed document. There is only a moral undertaking to respect the cease-fire, but Iran still refuses to acknowledge that state of affairs. Iran is also refusing to exchange prisoners, despite the effective cessation of hostilities, thereby violating the Geneva Convention of 1949, and has paid no heed to the repeated appeals of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

As I have already said, it does not fall within the purview of this body to examine details of negotiations concerning the implementation of resolution 598, but it is clear that the Iranian Minister has sought to take advantage of this forum solely for purposes of propaganda and in a desperate attempt to raise the question of chemical weapons in the usual misleading Iranian manner. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran seems to forget his Government's intensive endeavours to purchase weapons, including chemical weapons by all legal and illegal means, and the international information media are still talking about the scandals concerning the smuggling of chemical substances in which the Iranian régime was involved. In the most recent scandal, substances smuggled from a European country were seized in a port in the Arabian Gulf. The country concerned expelled the Iranian diplomats involved in these contraband operations. On this point, I should like to remind everyone that Iran was condemned for having used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as can be seen from the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran. He selected extracts to use for his own propaganda purposes and set aside everything that condemned his régime. These are the methods of equivocation and prevarication which have become a well-known behavioural characterstic of the Iranian régime. The Iranian Minister's

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

lamentation over the fate of children is the height of hypocrisy on the part of a régime that used children as human mine detonators, regarding such activities as feats of heroism.

Iraq played a constructive role in the Paris Conference, as everyone knows, and co-operated with other delegations objectively, but the Minsister for Foreign Affairs of Iran has ventured to accuse all the countries which participated in that Conference at Paris of having succumbed to alleged blackmail by Iraq. Everyone knows how the Iranian régime is blackmailing the international community through terrorism and hostage-taking. During the war, Iraq challenged Iran in every international forum, including the United Nations, through the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference, proposing that both parties should undertake without reservation, to respect all international treaties and conventions, as well as the rules of international law. The Iranian régime refused to enter into such commitments. Within the context of these endeavours, Iraq affirmed its full willingness to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 vis-à-vis any country that would for its part comply with the same Protocol, together with the provisions of all treaties, conventions and laws of an international nature. Finally, the most striking aspect of the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is that it reflects neither a political will to seek peace nor a sincere intention to achieve it. At a very time when endeavours are being made to achieve peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that régime should realize that everybody is aware of what goes on under its rule. Accordingly, his Government should respect present-day rationality, as well as the rules of international relations and civilized behaviour, and abandon its policy of prevarication, deceit and duplicity so as to ensure security, peace, stability and progress for the region and all its peoples. Otherwise the Iranian régime will merely bring distress and ruin on itself.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): We have asked for the floor today to introduce the latest Finnish Blue Book entitled "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, Second Proposal for Procedures Supporting the Reference Database". The first chapter of the report has already been presented about two weeks ago as a separate working paper on the instrumentation needed in the verification laboratory.

The starting point for our proposal of standard operating procedures as contained in this report is that the CW convention will include lists of chemicals and that laboratories must be able to monitor these chemicals reliably from real samples. The selection of the analytical instrumentation for a verification laboratory will entirely depend on the listed chemicals. Our methods have been developed for the monitoring of compounds at present listed in the annex on chemicals. At this stage the emphasis is on the chemicals listed in schedule (1), most of which date back to the two world wars. Although our techniques are intended to be universally applicable to a wide array of chemicals, novel agents might require new techniques.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The present annex contains large families of compounds. The usefulness of monitoring methods depends on the number of compounds to be monitored and on the availability of prerecorded identification data. If the number of compounds is large, they need to be grouped into subgroups to allow monitoring with specific methods. Monitoring of known chemicals, it may be added, is very much easier and speedier than structure elucidation of unknown chemicals.

The general-purpose definition of a chemical-warfare agent - that a chemical is a chemical-warfare agent if it is used for that purpose - will be useful in securing that the convention cannot be circumvented by claiming that an unlisted chemical is not covered by it. The definition can reasonably be applied in cases of alleged use. Owing to the rarity of such occurrences, the samples can be analysed with great care and in detail although the concentrations may be low. In cases of chemicals found in military arsenals there is plenty of the chemical available to enable a thorough analysis to be made quickly. But the general-purpose definition would be unwieldy as a basis for routine inspections of chemical facilities. In those cases the analysis must be based on named compounds whose absence rather than presence is verified. In a plant producing organophosphorus compounds, for example, the samples collected during routine on-site inspections should be monitored for their contents of listed organophosphorus compounds. Without a defined list of banned compounds and prerecorded identification data, the analyst would be faced with the task of identifying all compounds containing phosphorus, including intermediates, by-products, and impurities, in order to decide whether or not they belonged to the families covered by schedule (1). Using the computerized database the identification of a named chemical takes a fraction of a second, even on-site. The structure elucidation of an unnamed chemical could require weeks of hard work.

Accordingly, at least the chemicals in schedule (1) need to be individually defined, to allow the analytical laboratory to sign a report stating that no banned chemicals are present in the samples. The analyst must know exactly what chemicals to look for. The other alternative could be that the chemical industry declares and justifies all production, including raw materials, intermediates, by-products, impurities and so on. And these data would be included in the database of the verification laboratory. While it would succeed in revealing the production of undeclared organophosphorus compounds, I am afraid that it would be unacceptably intrusive and an unwieldy exercise for the Technical Secretariat. Moreover, it would not reveal novel agents whose structural properties were completely different from compounds listed in the schedules, unless declarations and justifications were expected of the whole chemical industry.

One of the tasks of the future Organization will be to follow chemical research and identify new chemicals to be included in the lists and placed under production control. To make implementation easier in the early days of the convention, as much development of analytical methods as possible should be done beforehand. The acquired expertise would also facilitate development and testing of analytical methods for possible novel agents.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

To ensure confidence among the States parties, the verification analyses will have to be done by methods accepted by the Organization. In our view, what this entails is the establishment of standard operating procedures and an analytical database accessible to all participating laboratories. The Finnish Research Project has been working toward this end for 15 years now.

The present report is a revised version of the proposed standard operating procedures for verification analyses presented in Report D.1 last year. Increased emphasis is now placed on quality control. Testing procedures are presented with a view to achieving good repeatability and reproducibility of results in different laboratories, which is needed to guarantee the reliability of analysis. It is essential that the quality of the analyses be demonstrated when the results must hold up in a court of law. Reproducibility also maximizes the advantages of an analytical database as a reference.

For this report we investigated 40 chemical warfare agents and their homologues. All relevant data including the spectra are annexed to this volume. As of now, all new data will be included in the VERIFY database immediately after analysis of compounds.

The methods we describe are written separately for each technique, so that each technique can exist independently. The eventual selection of equipment can be expected to vary from laboratory to laboratory and we wish to show what can be achieved with each technique separately.

The analytical procedure in each laboratory can be chosen on the basis of the combination of techniques available to the laboratory, the type of sample, and the nature of the task. During routine inspections the task may be the identification of known compounds. Challenge inspections may require also structure elucidation of unknown compounds.

It is our earnest hope that the basic work we are doing will prove useful to the Preparatory Commission and Technical Secretariat as they commence their arduous task of developing verification methodology and data in the first years after the convention has been opened for signature. In the meantime we will be happy if our efforts support and facilitate the ongoing negotiations in Geneva and the work of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in investigating the alleged uses of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Finland for her statement. There is no one else on the list of speakers. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? No.

The secretariat has today distributed at my request an informal document giving the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary organs for next week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be modified later if the nature of our work makes that necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference accepts the timetable.

It was so decided.

(The President)

I would remind you that immediately after the plenary meeting next Tuesday, the Conference is to hold an informal meeting to consider new measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. I will now adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be on Tuesday, 18 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.